Kern protocol · mechanics, visualised

How a block is born, and where the KRN comes from.

Five questions, answered with Kern's actual parameters: how blocks are produced, how gas is consumed, who gets the reward, whether KRN is minted forever, and how slashable attestations keep issuers honest.

01 · BLOCK PRODUCTION

How a block is produced — BFT in four moves

Kern uses a three-phase BFT consensus (propose / pre-endorse / endorse). One block per second. A block is irreversible once another endorsed block is built on top of it — about 2 seconds to finality. No probabilistic reorgs. Watch the round play out:

loops automatically · respects reduced-motion

Proposer

Propose

One validator — selected deterministically, weighted by stake — assembles transactions from the mempool and broadcasts a candidate block.

round 0 · t=0s

All validators

Pre-endorse

Each validator signs the block hash, signalling its commitment to vote for it.

gather > 2/3 stake

All validators

Endorse

Having seen pre-endorsements from > 2/3 of stake, each validator broadcasts its endorsement. At > 2/3 endorsements the block is endorsed.

> 2/3 quorum

The chain

Final

Once the next endorsed block builds on top, the level is final — it can never be reverted.

~2s after creation

The 2/3 rule

A block needs endorsements from more than two-thirds of the active stake to be valid. This is what gives deterministic finality: as long as fewer than 1/3 of validators are malicious or offline, an endorsed block cannot be reverted. If a proposer fails, round 1 (then 2, …) starts with a new proposer after 1 + n seconds.

02 · GAS & FEES

How gas is consumed per transaction

Every transaction declares two things: a fee (in mukrn — 1 KRN = 1 000 000 mukrn) and a gas_limit (an upper bound on computation). The protocol charges the fee whether the operation succeeds or fails — but the fee lands in very different places depending on the outcome.

Transaction
fee + gas_limit
declared by sender · paid in mukrn
KVM execution
consumes gas
0.1 mukrn / gas unit · reverts if gas exhausted
If success
fee → baker who included the tx
If failure (revert / invariant violation)
fee → burned (removed from supply)
OperationSuggested minimum feeNotes
Transfer1 000 mukrnsimple value move
Call5 000 mukrn + per-gasSkald contract entry
Origination10 000 mukrn + storage rentdeploy a contract
Per gas unit0.1 mukrncomputation cost

Storage rent (paid when deploying or growing a contract) splits 50% to the baker, 50% burned — tying KRN supply to real on-chain state usage. Fees come from users; they are not newly minted.

03 · BLOCK REWARD

Who gets paid when a block is finalized

Separate from user fees, each block mints a fresh reward (this is the issuance). That reward is split deterministically. Example below uses the steady-state value at the 50% target staking ratio: 0.079 KRN/block (79 220 mukrn).

Minted / block
100% — newly issued KRN
79 220 mukrn
→ Treasury
5%
~3 961 mukrn
→ Baker pool
95% — to validators
~75 259 mukrn
··· Proposer
10% of pool
~7 526 mukrn
··· Endorsers
90% of pool — split by stake
~67 733 mukrn

The proposer (who built the block) gets a fixed 10% bonus of the baker pool — it has higher operational overhead. The remaining 90% goes to endorsers proportional to their stake, because endorsement is what gives the block its finality. Delegators share their baker's rewards (Liquid PoS — custody stays with the delegator). Plus the baker keeps the fees of every successful transaction it included.

04 · ISSUANCE

Is KRN minted forever? Yes — but bounded and self-stabilizing

KRN is not a fixed-cap coin like Bitcoin. A fresh reward is minted every block, so issuance is perpetual. But the rate is mathematically bounded between 0.25%/yr and 6%/yr, and it adapts to how much KRN is staked. There is no scenario where the protocol runaway-inflates.

6% 0.25% 0% 50% 100% staking ratio (target) max 6% floor 0.25%
  • Low stake → inflation rises toward 6%, pulling more KRN into staking.
  • Between 0 and 50% → smooth decay (smoothstep curve, no gaming at the edges).
  • At / above 50% target → inflation floors at 0.25%/yr. Extra staking doesn't lower it further.
Staking ratioAnnual inflationReward / block
0%6.00%1.90 KRN
25%~2.16%0.69 KRN
40%~0.39%0.12 KRN
50% (target)0.25%0.079 KRN
75% (above)0.25%0.079 KRN
Net supply = issued − burned

Gross issuance is only half the story. KRN is continuously burned too: 50% of storage rent, 50% of slashing penalties, and 100% of failed-transaction fees. When on-chain activity is high, burns can match or exceed issuance — making real (net) inflation near zero or even negative. The 0.25% floor is the worst-case dilution for a holder who stakes; ~6% is the absolute worst case if nobody staked at all.

05 · ATTESTATIONS

How a slashable attestation keeps an issuer honest

Kern's signature primitive: an attestation is a signed claim by an issuer about a subject under a schema — a KYC check, an oracle price, a fund's NAV, an ESG figure. The issuer locks a bond in KRN. If they later sign a contradictory claim about the same (schema, subject), anyone can prove it and slash them. Honesty becomes the economically rational choice.

ATTEST

1 · Issue

The issuer signs (schema_id, subject, claim) and locks a bond. The attestation ID is deterministic — derived from its contents.

🔒 bond locked · e.g. 1 KRN
REVOKE_ATTESTATION

2a · Revoke (honest path)

The issuer can revoke the attestation when the claim no longer holds. The bond is returned. Revocation does not erase past equivocation, though.

↩ bond returned in full
SLASH_ATTESTATION_EQUIVOCATION

2b · Slash (dishonest path)

If the issuer signed two contradictory claims about the same (schema, subject) with overlapping validity, anyone submits both as evidence. The protocol verifies and slashes.

⚔ bond slashed 30%

When equivocation is proven, the slash is split three ways — the same math as the rest of the protocol's slashing. Example on a 1 KRN bond:

Bond
1.00
KRN locked at ATTEST
Slashed (30%)
0.30
taken from the bond
Whistleblower (10% of slash)
0.03
reward to the prover
Burned (rest)
0.27
removed from supply
Why this matters

This is the accountability primitive that other L1s lack. An oracle that posts a false price, a KYC provider that contradicts itself, a fund that misstates its NAV — all become slashable on-chain, with a standing 10%-of-slash bounty for whoever catches them. The reliability of the data is not a vendor's promise; it is a cryptoeconomic property enforced by the protocol. Both attestations are then marked consumed, so no one can double-slash the same offence.

Sourced from docs/consensus.md · docs/tokenomics.md · docs/adaptive-issuance.md · docs/attestations.md
Per-block figures use total_supply = 1B KRN for illustration; the percentages hold at any supply.